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Stories about productivity
When asked about their methodological practices, most economists claim 
to practise some form of instrumentalist positivism, as advocated by Friedman 
(1953) or appeal to Popper’s (1963) notions of falsification, implemented by the 
hypothesis-testing  procedures  of  classical  inference.  More  philosophically 
sophisticated members of the profession might, following Blaug (1980), refer to 
Lakatos’ (1970) methodology of scientific research programs.
In  practice,  however,  particularly  in  debates  over  economic  policy, 
economists  rely  heavily  on  a  ‘story-telling’  approach.  What  matters  in  this 
approach is not the formulation of decisive tests of statistical significance, but 
the application of economic reasoning to the relevant ‘stylised facts’ to produce a 
convincing narrative account. Although most prescriptive methodologists regard 
such story-telling as relying on inappropriate appeals to implicit presumptions 
and collective authority, this approach has been strongly defended by McCloskey 
(1983).
Beginning in the late 1990s, a narrative developed around the idea of a 
‘new’  or  ‘miracle’  economy  in  Australia.  Although  strong  macroeconomic 
performance, particularly during the Asian economic crisis, contributed to the 
appeal  of  this  narrative,  the  crucial  element  of  the  story  was  derived  from 
estimates of multifactor productivity (MFP) developed by the Australian Bureau 
of  Statistics  (various  years),  first  published  by  the  in  the  late  1990s,  and 
presented by the Productivity Commission (Parham 1999, 2000) as evidence of 
the success of microeconomic reform.
The  ABS  estimates  showed  a  surge  in  productivity  beginning  around 
1993-94,  and  were  interpreted  as  showing  the  benefits  of  the  micro-economic 
reforms  undertaken  by  the  Hawke–Keating  government.  Although  the 
improvement in estimated MFP growth rate was not sustained beyond 1998-99, 
the story of a productivity surge driven by reform continues to be told.
The statistical basis for the ‘new economy’ story has been disputed by 
critics. Quiggin (2001) argued that the observed upsurge in estimated rates of 2
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MFP growth could be explained, in large measure, by recovery from recession 
and by an unsustainable increase in work intensity.1 Quiggin (2005) claimed 
that  the  slowdown  in  MFP  after  1998-99  supported  this  view.  A  more 
fundamental criticism was offered by Hancock (2005), who fitted simple linear 
and  quadratic  models  to  the  data  and  found  that  the  null  hypothesis  of  a 
constant rate of MFP growth could not be rejected. In response, Parham (2005a) 
argued that an appropriate analysis of data, using smoothing, error-correction 
and  appropriate  timing  of  cyclical  breaks  supported  claims  of  a  productivity 
‘surge’ in the 1990s.
In this paper, it will be argued that, given its relatively short duration 
and  high  year-to-year  variability,  the  MFP  data  set  does  not  contain  enough 
information  to  allow  clear  statistical  discrimination  between  competing 
hypotheses. As a result of this lack of information, combined with the human 
predilection for observing patterns, a range of alternative stories, each of which 
may  be  supported  by  an  appropriate  interpretation  of  the  data,  has  been 
produced.
Three  such  stories  are  described  here.  The  first  is  the  ‘New  Economy’ 
story put forward by Parham and others. The second story agrees with the first 
regarding  the  1990s,  but  interprets  the  subsequent  decline  in  productivity 
growth as the result of a failure to pursue microeconomic reform with sufficient 
vigour. The third story rejects the idea of a productivity miracle in the 1990s and 
argues instead that productivity growth rates experienced a sharp decline at the 
end of the postwar ‘Golden Age’ around 1970, and that this decline has been 
sustained, although with fluctuations around the trend.
1   For reasons that are not clear, Parham (2005a) summarises this paper as follows: ‘A self-
professed sceptic, Quiggin (2001) has come to accept that there was a productivity surge, though 
his  is  at  the  low  end  of  estimates’.  The  conclusion  of  Quiggin  (2001)  was:   ‘The  claim  that 
economic performance in the 1990s was comparable with that of the golden age of the 1960s is 
inconsistent  with  the  empirical  evidence.  On  the  basis  of  the  available  data,  it  is  not  even 
possible to conclude with confidence that the underlying rate of productivity growth was higher 




Beginning in the late 1990s, the Australian Bureau of Statistics began 
producing estimates of MFP for the market sector, going back to 1963-64. The 
crucial requirement for the development of these estimates was the construction 
of estimates of the capital stock, thereby permitting the derivation of estimates 
of MFP in place of partial labour productivity measures.
The  ABS  statistics  were  organised  using  the  concept  of  productivity 
cycles, typically of about six years, which were inferred from the properties of the 
annual  MFP  series.  Although  productivity  cycles  typically  corresponded  fairly 
closely  to  expansion  and  contraction  phases  of  macroeconomic  cycles,  no 
exogenous information was used in dating cycles.
From a statistical viewpoint, the central question is whether the data set 
contains enough information to make reliable claims about average levels and 
trends in productivity growth and about the occurrence or absence of a structural 
break in those trends in the early 1990s.
It  is  important  to  observe  that  the  ability  to  derive  robust  inferences   
from a data set typically declines each time the data is differenced. Thus, the 
data contains more evidence on the level of MFP than on the rate of growth of 
MFP, and more evidence on the rate of growth of MFP than on trends in the rate 
of growth of MFP. Attempts to detect a structural break in the trend rate of 
growth of MFP are therefore likely to be fraught with difficulty.
The  data  set  allows  a  decisive  rejection  of  the  obvious  null  hypothesis 
relating to the rate of growth of  MFP, namely that the rate is zero. On the other 
hand,  as  Hancock  (2005)  shows,  using  Ordinary  Least  Squares  to  estimate  a 
simple linear trend of the form
MFP(t) = a + bt,
the null hypothesis b = 0 cannot be rejected at standard levels of significance. 
Similar results are obtained using a quadratic functional form
MFP(t) = a + bt + ct2.4
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Parham (2005a) criticises Hancock’s analysis arguing that the failure to 
find  statistically  significant  results  reflects  short-term  noise  in  the  data,  and 
that it is better to focus on smoothed data. If the ABS analysis of productivity 
cycles is accepted, it seems most natural to focus on a data set consisting of such 
cycles, as is done in most of the informal discussion of the topic. This data set is 
presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Multifactor productivity growth since 1964-65
a: Percentage points, annual average
b Percentage points
Notes
1. Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics
2. The long-term average rate from 1964-65 to 2004-05 is 1.2 per cent
3. Excluded observation for 2004-05, -1.7 per cent
The obvious problem for statistical analysis is that there are only eight 
data  points.  This  would  be  enough  to  detect  a  trend  if  the  series  declined  or 
increased steadily. There are seven differences in the series, so the probability 
that they are all of the same sign (either positive or negative),   under the null 
hypothesis of stationarity, is 2-n+1 or 1.5 per cent for n=7, which is sufficiently 
small to reject the null hypothesis. However, no such monotone trend is present 
in the data set.
Any more complex pattern is impossible to confirm or reject with such a 
limited  data  set,  using  standard  classical  inference  testing.  Parham  (2005a) 































a  productivity  surge  in  the  1990s.  However,  the  ability  of  the  human  eye  to 
detect apparent patterns in random data is notorious. It is not difficult to find 
interpretations consistent with prior beliefs, but it seems clear from the course of 
the debate so far that a wide range of prior beliefs can be supported by visual 
inspection of the data.
Neither the raw annual data, nor the cyclical arrangement preferred by 
the ABS justifies rejection of the null hypothesis of random variation about a 
constant mean. There are a range of intermediate options, involving either the 
use of smoothed versions of the data set or the application of error-correction 
models to the raw data. 
Parham (2005b) reports that statistical modelling using error correction 
methods  yielded  support  for  the  hypothesis  of  a  structural  break  in  1990-91. 
However, since there are a great many possible models incorporating structural 
breaks at different points in the data series, it is hard to assess the power of 
statistical tests. Given nearly 40 possible choices for a break point, it would be 
not be surprising to find the null hypothesis of a constant trend rejected for at 
least one of these points using standard statistical tests. 
It seems unlikely that such results, mostly estimated over the period up 
to 1998-99, would prove robust if the same model were fitted to the out-of-sample 
data that has subsequently been observed.  McKenzie (2005) using data for the 
period up to 2002-03 finds no evidence that the ‘spike’ in productivity during the 
mid-1990s was sustained.
Alternative stories
In  the  absence  of  any  clear  statistical  resolution  of  disputes  over  the 
correct interpretation of the productivity data, it may be useful to consider an 
analysis  of  the  debate  based  on  a  rhetorical  or  ‘storytelling’  approach  to 
descriptive methodology. In this approach, rather than considering a description 
of research in terms of the formulation and testing of hypotheses, we consider 
various alternative stories that can be told about the data, and the factors that 
might lead to these stories being accepted or rejected in a given community.6
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The ‘New Economy’ story
According  to  the  ‘New  Economy’  the  program  of  microeconomic  reform 
that began with the floating of the Australian dollar in 1983 has, after some 
initial disruption, produced a new, more flexible and more productive Australian 
economy. Thus, the pain of structural adjustment has been more than offset by 
the gains from sustained high economic growth.
The ‘New Economy’ story was developed with a focus on estimates of MFP 
for the 1990s, and particularly the cycle from 1993-94 to 1998-99. After declining 
fairly steadily from the ‘Golden Age’ of the 1960s to the early 1990s, estimated 
rates of MFP growth showed a sharp upturn for the cycle beginning in 1993–94, 
matching or exceeding those of the ‘Golden Age’. The final estimates for the cycle 
from 1993-94 to 1998-99 show a productivity growth rate of 2.0 per cent, the 
highest of any period in the ABS data set.
Advocates of the New Economy story, most notably Parham (2005b), have 
explained  the  relatively  weak  MFP  growth  estimated  for  the  period  since 
1998-99 as the product of a variety of temporary factors, including a ‘short-term 
blip’ in 2000-01, possibly associated with the introduction of the GST, drought in 
2002-03  and  2003-04,  the  Olympic  Games  in  2004,  and,  more  recently, 
bottlenecks constraining growth in mineral exports.
Given underlying strong MFP growth, however, each of these temporary 
shocks should have been followed by above-normal MFP growth, as productivity 
returned  to  its  long-term  growth  path.  The  idea  of  a  ‘productivity  cycle’ 
incorporates the notion that short-term effects like those discussed above should 
wash out over the course of a cycle.
This point is developed further by Dolman et al. (2006) who conclude that
 ‘in an historical context, the productivity surge of the late 
1990s,  rather  than  the  most  recent  productivity  cycle, 
appears to be the more unusual experience.’ 
Dolman et al. consider a variety of explanations of the surge in measured 
productivity  during  the  1990s,  including  microeconomic  reform,  but  find  that 
none of them are consistent with the slowdown observed after 1999. 7
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The ‘New Economy’ story gains more support from macroeconomic than 
from microeconomic outcomes. The current expansion, which has already lasted 
fifteen years since the trough of the 1990-91 recession, is one of the longest on 
record  in  Australia,  and  one  of  the  longest  for  any  OECD  country  in  recent 
decades. It was continued growth during the Asian economic crisis of 1997 and 
1998 that led to Krugman (1998) describing Australia’s as a ‘miracle economy’.
There  is,  however,  no  clear  reason  to  link  microeconomic  reform  to 
macroeconomic  stability.  Supporters  of  the  ‘New  Economy’  thesis  argue  that 
market-oriented  microeconomic  reform  has  increased  the  flexibility  of  the 
economy. However, observation of the global business cycle over the past two 
centuries gives little support for this view. Even though economic intervention 
was very limited in the 19th century, severe recessions and depressions occurred 
regularly. Similarly, government intervention, regulation and unionisation were 
very  limited  in  the  United  States  in  the  1920s,  but  that  did  not  prevent  the 
occurrence of the Great Depression.
Despite these objections, the rhetorical appeal of the New Economy story 
is obvious. The narrative is one of virtue rewarded, always a popular theme. The 
rapid growth in wealth observed over the past few years is attributed, not to 
macroeconomic good fortune and a global decline in interest rates, but to the 
hard work and sacrifice of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
‘The light that failed’
An alternative story, also popular with some advocates of microeconomic 
reform agrees with the New Economy story in presenting rapid growth during 
the cycle from 1993-94 to 1998-99 as representing the benefits of microconomic 
reform.  However,  the  period  from  1999-00  onwards  is  viewed  more 
pessimistically. The slowdown in productivity growth is regarded as real, and the 
result of a slowdown in the pace of microeconomic reform.
The  major  difficulty  for  this  story  is  one  of  timing.  While  the  Howard 
government  has  taken  a  less  consistent  approach  to  reform  than  its  Labor 
predecessors, it introduced a number of major reforms in its first few years in 8
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office. Many of these were measures that had long been demanded by advocates 
of  radical  reform  but  resisted  by  the  Labor  government  because  of  political 
sensitivities.  These  included  the  Workplace  Relations  Act   1996  (Cwlth),  the 
partial privatisation of Telstra in 1998 and 1999, waterfront reform in 1998, and, 
most notably, the Goods and Services Tax, introduced in 2000.
Moreover, many reforms introduced by the Hawke–Keating government 
did  not  begin  to  take  effect  until  after  1998.  The  most  notably  of  these  is 
National Competition Policy. Most states did not even complete their legislative 
reviews or set up their general regulatory bodies until 1998, and the National 
Competition Policy process, with associated payments to the states was still not 
completed by 2003-04.
If such an array of reforms is not sufficient to maintain even an average 
rate of productivity growth, the whole rationale of microeconomic reform is called 
into question. Far from generating sustained growth, the ‘light that failed’ story 
suggests that the decade or more of microeconomic reform that began with the 
floating  of  the  dollar  in  1983,  produced  only  five  years  of  above  average 
productivity growth before requiring a renewed burst of reform merely to sustain 
past gains.
In  view  of  the  substantial  adjustment  costs  associated  with 
microeconomic reform, the ‘light that failed’ story implies that, in many cases, 
the net present value of microeconomic reform must be negative. It is generally 
conceded,  for  example,  that  the  short-term  consequences  of  financial 
deregulation included a relaxation of lending standards that contributed to the 
severity  of  the  1990-91  recession.  If  the  benefits  of  this  reform  were  only 
temporary, being exhausted by 1998-99, the present value, viewed from an ex 
ante perspective, was almost certainly negative.
The most convincing argument for the ‘light that failed’ story is based on 
the  idea  that  international  competition  is  becoming  steadily  more  intense, 
necessitating ever more radical reform. But this idea is obviously inconsistent 
with the claim that microeconomic reform is associated with increasing welfare 
and  economic  productivity.  The  whole  point  of  economic  progress  is  that  the 9
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choice set available to society should expand, not contract. 
Again, however, the ‘light that failed’ story has a strong rhetorical appeal.   
Surprisingly, perhaps, calls for sacrifice are always popular, and the view that it 
is never time to rest on your oars can always count on a hearing. The ‘light that 
failed’ story combines this rhetorical appeal with adherence to the claim that 
Australia did indeed experience a productivity miracle.
The ‘blip’ story
The  central  point  of  the  ‘blip’  story  (Hancock  2005,  McKenzie  2005, 
Quiggin  2005)  is  that  the  productivity  ‘surge’  of  the  1990s  was  a  statistical 
illusion. The central theme of the story is that the notion of a ‘productivity cycle’ 
is misleading, since the correct basis for comparison is derived from the business 
cycle rather than from internal properties of the series of productivity estimates. 
Dividing business cycles into two or more productivity cycles is likely to produce 
alternating periods of weak (contraction phases) and strong (expansion phases) 
productivity growth. This point is observed by Dolman et al. (2006) who note (p. 
42) ‘A period of strong multi-factor productivity growth is not typically followed 
by another similar period.’
In  addition  to  the  general  pattern  of  alternating  expansion  and 
contraction phases, Quiggin (2001) points to a number of temporary factors that 
led  to  an  overestimation  of  MFP  growth  for  the  mid-1990s  cycle.  The  most 
important  was  an  increase  in  work  intensity,  correlated  with  an  increase  in 
reported and unreported working hours, and supported by widespread anecdotal 
evidence. Reported working hours for full-time workers peaked around 2000, as 
did popular discussion of increased work intensity. Thus, it seems likely that 
gains in measured productivity from this source during the 1990s were, at least 
partially, reversed after 2000.
Consideration of the MFP data supports this view. For the entire period 
since 1993-94, including the most recent observation for 2004-05, the average 
rate  of  MFP  growth  is  1.2  per  cent,  exactly  the  same  as  for  the  entire  data 
period. For the current incomplete macroeconomic cycle, beginning at the last 10
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cyclical peak in 1988-89, the rate of MFP growth is below the long term average
Thus, the ‘blip’ story is parsimonious as an explanation, and fits the data 
well.  On  the  other  hand,  a  negative  finding  lacks  rhetorical  appeal.  The 
publication bias against such findings is well-known (Scargle 2000).
To  the  extent  that  the  ‘blip’  story  has  rhetorical  appeal,  it  does  so  by 
enhancing the contrast between the ‘Golden Age’ from World War II to the early 
1970s and the long period of poor economic performance that began with the 
breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s. Although the ABS 
MFP  data  only  goes  back  to  the  early  1960s,  and  begins  with  an  anomalous 
decline in MFP from 1964-65 to 1965-66, it seems likely that MFP growth was 
strong  throughout  the  Golden  Age,  which  was  also  characterised  by  full 
employment and steady reductions in the inequality of income distribution. By 
contrast, the period since the early 1970s has been disappointing in all these 
respects. 
An  analysis  showing  higher  productivity  growth  for  the  period  before 
1970 compared to the subsequent period is appealing for those who prefer the 
policies of the Golden Age, including Keynesian macroeconomic stabilisation, and 
an expanding welfare state, to the less interventionist policies associated with 
the program of microeconomic reform. 
Concluding comments
Considered in Popperian or Lakatosian terms, the ‘New Economy’ claim 
that  Australia  experienced  a  productivity  surge  in  the  1990s,  driven  by 
microeconomic reform in the preceding decade must be regarded as a refuted 
hypothesis.  In  the  Popperian  approach,  the  crucial  test  of  a  hypothesis  is 
prediction and potential falsification.
 The natural prediction of the New Economy hypothesis, put forward at 
the  time  the  hypothesis  was  formulated  was  that  the  further  reforms  of  the 
1990s  would  generate  continued  strong  growth  in  measured  multifactor 
productivity. This prediction was refuted by the observed outcome. Subsequent 
attempts  either  to  explain  away  contradictory  evidence  or  to  ‘save  the 11
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phenomena’ by advancing the modified ‘light that failed’ hypothesis may be seen 
as evidence, in the terminology of Lakatos, of a degenerating scientific research 
program.
Considered  in  the  rhetorical  terms  proposed  by  McCloskey  (1983), 
however, the ‘New Economy’ story and its variants remain highly successful. The 
view  that  Australia’s  long-running  economic  expansion,  and  the  associated 
growth in household wealth is the product of tough decisions in the past, rather 
than a combination of asset inflation and adroit macroeconomic management has 
obvious appeal. 
This appeal may be found both in the optimistic ‘New Economy’ version 
which projects a renewal of strong productivity growth as a result of reforms 
already undertaken, and in the more pessimistic ‘light that failed’ story in which 
we are in danger of losing the gains of the 1990s. Notably, while giving directly 
opposed  interpretations  of  the  data  for  the  most  recent  productivity  cycle, 
advocates of the two stories derive the same policy conclusion: more reform is 
needed.
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